It seems to be a common sense notion that people fight over differing religious beliefs. Consider the following paragraph from an NPR news story, which I take to be typical:
When Osama bin Laden declared war on the West in 1996, he cited the Quran’s command to “strike off” the heads of unbelievers. More recently, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hasan lectured his colleagues about jihad, or “holy war,” and the Quran’s exhortation to fight unbelievers and bring them low. Hasan is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, last year.
We are to believe, apparently, that these people acted out of their Muslim beliefs, and against those who did not share their beliefs.
I am growing increasingly suspicious of this idea that people come to blows or “clash” over differences in belief or faith. I am of course in full agreement with the many anti-essentialist criticisms of the “clash of civilizations” thesis: there are no monolithic civilizations, and as such there can be no monumental “clash” between them (the last chapter of Chiara Bottici’s A Philosophy of Political Myth contains a particularly good version of this criticism). But this is not what I’m angling at here. What bothers me is the very idea that people fight over “beliefs” at all, monolithic or not.
Upon reflection it’s difficult to see how or why people could ever come to blows over differences in mere belief. If you believe that chocolate ice cream is the best, and I believe that vanilla is far superior, what practical difference does this difference make? Where substantial interests do not diverge, getting along is not that difficult. I assume that this is why liberal interfaith work tends to appeal to people with the same middle- or upper-class bourgeois lifestyle: when Jews, Christians, and Muslims of the same social class are living relatively identical material lives, of course there is unlikely to be any conflict of interests between them. Once a set of religious practices and practitioners are domesticated by late capitalism, it is difficult to see where a clash of interests might lie.
I would argue people don’t tend to fight over differences in belief; they tend to fight over conflicts of interest. However, characterizing conflicts in terms of belief has the effect of masking conflicts of interest.
I’m prepared to take this one step farther: perhaps the talk of “religious violence” as resulting from “beliefs” is not merely misguided, but is in fact motivated. Perhaps those who utilize the “divided by faith” rhetoric want to forget that conflicts usually follow from a clash of interests rather than a difference in beliefs.
Were we to openly reflect on our interests, we might have to think about how the interests of the American empire are at odds with the interests of others. We might have to reflect on the fact that al Qaeda’s stated reasons for attacking America were not that America is Christian, but that America is complicit in Israel’s domination of Palestine, that America has a military presence throughout the Middle East (which it uses to manipulate the oil industry), that America supported sanctions against Iraq that prohibited the transfer of medical goods (which resulted in the preventable deaths of many Iraqis), and that America’s military campaign in Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of a number of civilians.
One can read bin Laden’s statements on these matters in an edited volume titled The Al Qaeda Reader. However, the book blurb belies the very contents of the book. Rather than conflicts of interests, Random House’s website says that readers will find:
Despite our tendency to dismiss Islamic extremism as profoundly irrational, al-Qaeda is not without a coherent body of beliefs. Like other totalitarian movements, the movement’s leaders have rationalized their brutality in a number of published treatises. Now, for the first time, The Al Qaeda Reader gathers together the essential texts and documents that trace the origin, history, and evolution of the ideas of al-Qaeda founders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden.
It seems the author(s) of this blurb failed to read the book; while this blurb portrays al Qaeda as a group acting out of a set of “beliefs” and “ideas,” the writings contained therein suggest that al Qaeda acts out of a conflict of interests.
Of course we needn’t take bin Laden’s claims at face value, nor need we take for granted the monolithic identities he constructs or assumes. On the contrary, I fully support subjecting his rhetoric to the hermeneutics of suspicion.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric that posits that he acts out of beliefs rather than a conflict of interests should simultaneously be subjected to the hermeneutics of suspicion. Perhaps the idea that we are “divided by faith” is designed to help us forget that the interests of the American empire are sometimes at odds with the interests of others.
(For more on the myth of religious violence, see Richard King’s contribution to this volume or William Cavanaugh’s book on the subject. For more on the rhetorical effect of talking about religion as a matter of inward belief, see the first chapter in Talal Asad’s Genealogies of Religion, or Russell McCutcheon’s book on the domestication of religion. For more on the characterization of religion as the irrational “other” of western empires, see Tim Fitzgerald’s book on the rhetoric of civility.)